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THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN APPELLATE
JUDGING: A BRIEF REFLECTION ON A
TIMELESS CONCERN
Judith S. Kayet
It is impossible to let these historic years pass without com-
menting on the magnificence of our bicentennial celebration. So
many times lately we have gathered on community lawns, in court-
houses, in schools-with balloons and bands and the Star Spangled
Banner-to pay tribute to our Constitution and to this nation's
founders for a document and tradition that have endured as our
backbone and conscience through 200 years of societal change.
What a great refresher course we are having in American origins.
It is ironic that in 1987-while debate raged over how the Con-
stitution should be interpreted'-we were also given a living lesson,
a nationwide seminar in United States government, particularly the
interaction of its three branches, through the confirmation process
ofJudge Robert Bork. I have not found anything on television more
magnetizing than the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, and I
am delighted that public interest in these lengthy televised sessions
was so widespread. Tradespeople in my neighborhood suddenly
wanted only to talk about Bork; more than ever I began to dread
long red lights and traffic jams while seated in New York City taxi-
cabs; in Albany a woman told me that every night she set up her
ironing in front of the television set. (That's a lot of ironing.) The
word "Borkian" is probably in serious contention for the next edi-
tion of Webster's.
The personalities were fascinating, to be sure, but by the fifth or
fifteenth or fiftieth hour it simply had to be the dialogue and not the
actors that captivated viewers and held them riveted to their televi-
sion sets. The public became genuinely absorbed by the issue of
"judicial restraint" versus 'judicial policy-making:" what exactly is
the proper role of the flesh and blood human being-the individual
judge's own values and philosophy-in Supreme Court adjudication
of constitutional questions that are so obviously fundamental to the
t Associate Judge, New York State Court of Appeals. This paper is an expanded
version of the remarks delivered to the New York County Lawyers' Association, Decem-
ber 10, 1987.
1 See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985); Wachtler, Our Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 381 (1987).
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kind of society we have? The words "judicial policy-making" and
"judicial law-making," for some, have become words of terror signi-
fying an arrogation of power, an intrusion into the domain of the
legislature, judges gone wild.
If you believe that there can be such a thing as coincidence,
then an extraordinary coincidence occurred on September 17,
1987-the day 200 years ago that convention delegates in Philadel-
phia actually put their signatures to the Constitution. That was
Judge Bork's third day of testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee and, coincidentally, also the day Justice Brennan deliv-
ered the Cardozo Lecture at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York-a talk plainly prepared long in advance of Justice Pow-
ell's resignation and the Bork nomination. Justice Brennan's lecture
was called "Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress of the Law.' ."2 It
was the antithesis of the judicial philosophy being expressed that
very day in Washington.
Passion, according to Justice Brennan, is "the range of emo-
tional and intuitive responses to a given set of facts or arguments,
responses which often speed into our consciousness far ahead of the
lumbering syllogisms of reason." I have to admit, I never thought
of "passion" quite that way. In eloquent passages intensifying the
grace, the sheer poetry of Judge Cardozo's Nature of the Judicial Pro-
cess, Justice Brennan had as his thesis that interpretation of the Con-
stitution-particularly its guarantee of due process-demands the
full measure of every human capacity, that we cannot "take refuge in
the illusion of rational certainty." The interplay of forces, he said,
the "internal dialogue of reason and passion, does not taint the judi-
cial process, but is in fact central to its vitality," 4 particularly in mat-
2 42 REC. Assoc. BAR. CITY OF N.Y. 948 (1987).
3 Id at 958.
4 Id. at 951. According to Justice Brennan:
[The Constitution's] broadly phrased guarantees of our freedoms ensure
that the Constitution need never become an anachronism: the Constitu-
tion will endure as a vital charter of human liberty as long as there are
those with the courage to defend it, the vision to interpret it, and the
fidelity to live by it.
Yet the open-ended nature of a written constitution, and the diffi-
culty of reconciling competing principles and passions, places an enor-
mous responsibility on the judge.
Id. at 962. Justice Brennan focused particularly on the Due Process Clause, noting that:
[it] demands of judges more than proficiency in logical analysis. It re-
quires that we be sensitive to the balance of reason and passion that mark
a given age, and the ways in which that balance leaves its mark on the
everyday exchanges between government and citizen. In order to do so,
we must draw on our own experience as inhabitants of that age, and our
own sense of the uneven fabric of social life. We cannot delude ourselves
that the Constitution takes the form of a theorem whose axioms need
mere logical deduction.
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ters of constitutional interpretation.
I do not intend to discuss the bicentennial or Judge Bork or
constitutional decision-making by the United States Supreme Court
or by the New York Court of Appeals. But I do wish to share a few
related thoughts about one of the many timeless issues rekindled by
these most recent chapters in American history-the part played by
ajudge's own values and sense ofjustice, or "passion," when sitting
in review of nonconstitutional questions, the statutory issues as well as
the everyday problems that are the grist of our common law pro-
cess. While often less dramatic than the burning constitutional is-
sues, these decisions made day in and day out by appellate courts
throughout the nation are obviously also a major force in shaping
the kind of society we have, and they touch the lives and affairs of
most of us perhaps even more directly.
Long before the issue flared up in connection with the recent
Supreme Court nomination, and especially as ajudge, I had thought
a great deal about the proper balance of person and precedent in
deciding the publicly significant issues that come before the courts.
By that I do not mean to suggest that any case in our court is unim-
portant-it is not; but what I wish to focus on are the cases that
come to us with lights flashing and bells ringing as issues that likely
will have broad social impact.
Every human being-judges included-certainly has a view or
philosophy or outlook on life, some notion about what society
needs, and all manner of personal feelings, beliefs, and experiences.
Yet the Court of Appeals is exclusively a court of law. With few
exceptions, we are by constitution, statute, and abundant case law
without jurisdiction to decide anything but issues of law.5 Over the
years that it has been my good fortune to serve on the Court of
Appeals, I have come to appreciate how as a court of law, deciding
only issues of law, within a government of law, we can and do and
must, also bring the full measure of every human capacity to bear in
resolving the cases before us.
I doubt that anyone today would seriously question the propo-
sition that appellate decision-making is more than a mechanical ex-
ercise of locating citations and affixing them to facts found below.
The view of the function as entirely formalistic, as a matter of pure
reason and scientific search, manifests not judicial restraint but in-
tellectual nonsense. Judge Cardozo himself observed that judges do
not stand aloof on the chill and distant heights of pure reason, im-
Id. at 966-67.
5 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(a); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5501(b) (McKinney,
1983); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.90(2)(a) (McKinney 1983), People v. McRay, 51
N.Y.2d 594, 601, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 435 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (1980).
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mune from the tides and currents that engulf the rest of mankind,
"and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if
they do. ' 6 He recognized that the judicial process "in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation."' 7 Those sentiments ex-
pressed in the year 1920 were apparently widely regarded as a legal
version of hard core pornography that no one but a saint like Car-
dozo could get away with.8 I suspect that the public view has
changed somewhat over the past 68 years-both as to what consti-
tutes hard core pornography and as to the true and proper function
of appellate judges.
To my mind, the mere statement of the proposition that human
values must be abjured by appellate judges exposes its fallacy: how
but by the application of some measure of human understanding
and contemporary experience could a judge today resolve the un-
precedented legal issues that crowd the court dockets? Even if the
law were declared dead, always to remain static, the problems con-
fronted by the courts are people's problems, and the infinite ingenu-
ity of the human mind seems never to concoct the identical situation
twice. Immediately there is judicial handtailoring to be done, often
requiring choices among sound alternatives, simply to fit existing
precedents to the very next suit. And even if nothing more were
required of appellate courts than the application of codes made by
others, the exercise is necessarily more than mechanical. There are
inevitably gaps to be filled and anomalies to be treated as statutes
are tested in the crucible of live controversies that even the most far-
seeing legislators could not have contemplated.
With every session of our court in Albany, I am increasingly
struck by the changed nature of the business of a common law court
in a great commercial state, which is surely reflective of profound
changes both in the litigation process and in society generally. Our
docket is substantially devoted to criminal appeals, to the interpreta-
tion of ever-proliferating statutes as our law has grown increasingly
codified, and to review of administrative agency decisions, where the
problems of our citizenry seem more and more to be resolved. In
the past year, for example, there has likely not been a single session
without appeals involving children under the Family Court Act and
the penal laws-child abuse and neglect cases, parental rights termi-
nation cases, juvenile delinquencies-as the family has taken the law
into its midst; and there has likely not been a single session without
6 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
7 Id. at 166. See also Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and
Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961).
8 G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 77 (1977). See supra note 2, at 951 for
the historical context in which these unorthodox views were expressed.
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appeals from prison administrative determinations arising under
regulations of the Commissioner of Corrections. In the year 1920,
when Judge Cardozo delivered the lectures that became the classic
Nature of the Judicial Process there were no such cases. The entire law
of prisoners' rights probably could have been summarized in one
sentence: This page intentionally left blank.
But while the business of the Court of Appeals has changed
dramatically as society has evolved, while the number and topics of
the cases we hear today are vastly different, when the meaning of a
statute is in dispute, there remains at the core the same process of
discerning, interpreting, and applying the will of the lawmakers. In
applying the laws declared by others-be they statutes, regulations,
or orders-there is no question that judges frequently are left to
choose among competing policies, thereby narrowing or broaden-
ing the reach of the law, and determining its range and direction.
A time-honored principle of statutory construction often may
be found to support the position of each party, as is evident in the
fact that two courts below ours may already have divided respectably
on the meaning of the provision in issue. One principle of construc-
tion tells us that courts interpreting statutes must look to the words
used by the legislature; explicit statutory provisions should be ap-
plied as written. But another principle tells us that if literalness
yields absurdity, or if it fails to give effect to the underlying legisla-
tive purpose, courts are not to apply the statutory provisions as writ-
ten but are to seek some other meaning. McKinney's Book on
Statutes is filled with such bedeviling points and counterpoints. 9
I am reminded by several recent volumes of Court of Appeals
opinions that, just within the past few years, the court has deter-
mined, under one rubric of statutory construction or another, many
socially significant issues within the state statutory law. The court
has determined, for example, that a medical license acquired by one
spouse during marriage may be "marital property" as that term is
used in the Domestic Relations Law, 10 and that increases in the
value of separate property of one spouse may also fall within that
statutory term;II that there is no private right of action for securities
fraud under the General Business Law;' 2 that the term "environ-
ment" as used in environmental conservation laws may include
9 See generally Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 767-69 (1965), and
particularly, K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960).
10 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
11 Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
12 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116,519 N.Y.S.2d
804 (1987). See also All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33,
506 N.Y.S.2d 10, (1986) (defining "securities" under, Section 352-e of New York Gen-
eral Business Law).
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short-term and long-term effects of secondary displacement of local
residents and businesses; 13 that only communications made confi-
dentially to journalists come within the Shield Law; 14 that letters of
credit are not attachable "property" as that word is used in the Civil
Practice Law and Rules.' 5 The court in a recent celebrated criminal
case defined the statutory defense of "justification,"' 6 and it defined
the word "death" for purposes of homicide prosecutions under the
Penal Law.17
The legislature has established the requirement of corrobora-
tion for certain crimes, but it remains for the court as a matter of
statutory construction to give substance to the word "corrobora-
tion,"18 and the phrase "mistake of law,"' 9 and the term "actually
present" 20 as used in the penal statutes. These words can rarely be
defined by simply consulting a good dictionary. The cases would
hardly reach us if there were not genuine ground for difference. Yet
when the court interpreting a statute concludes that an indictment
must be dismissed or a conviction affirmed or a damages award
modified, that determination not only affects the litigants but also
influences future decisions of others as to what crimes will be prose-
cuted and what lawsuits brought-in short, what conduct will be tol-
erated by society generally.
If this is so as to statutory law, where the role of the court is
circumscribed by the words and intent of the legislature-if human
value judgments can play any part in a judge's choice between one
reading of key statutory provisions and another-then it must be all
the more so as to the common law. Common law, after all, is law
that is out-and-out made by judges.
The value judgments of appellate judges can hardly be alien to
the development of the common law; they are essential to it.
Choices among the precedents of another day-which to bring for-
13 Chinese Staff and Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502 N.E.2d
176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986). See also Jackson v. New York Urban Dev. Corp., 67
N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986).
14 In re Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
15 In re Supreme Merchandise Co. v. Chemical Bank, 70 N.Y.2d 344, 514 N.E.2d
1358, 520 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1987).
16 People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1986). See also,
People v. Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1986) and People
v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 496 N.E.2d 202, 505 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1986).
17 People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
18 People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101, 518 N.E.2d 908, 524 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1987); People
v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 299,472 N.E.2d 4,482 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1984). See also In re Nicole V.,
71 N.Y.2d 112, 518 N.E.2d 914, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1987) (defining "corroboration" in
child protective proceedings).
19 People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987).
20 People v. Hedgman, 70 N.Y.2d 533, 517 N.E.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1987).
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ward, which to leave behind, which to extend to meet some new
condition, which to limit or overrule-mark the progress of the law.
This process breathes life into our law; it gives relevance and ration-
ality in the year 1988 to rules fashioned for another day, so that they
command acceptance as principles by which we live.
Reflecting on the subject of this article, I have read the Court of
Appeals decisions of the year 1928-which will no doubt lend a
wonderful freshness and vitality to my own opinions in 1988. I have
a new wealth of knowledge on the law relating to barge canals and
the common law of insurance. I picked 1928 because it yielded an
even number, and because it fell within the tenure of Chief Judge
Cardozo, before he left our court for the United States Supreme
Court. That was the year of Moch v. Rensselaer,21 Meinhard v.
Salmon,22 and Palsgraf v. The Long Island Railroad,23 to name a few. In
one sense I found it disheartening; so few of the hundreds of deci-
sions of that year are familiar to me today, and so many utterly un-
known. That is a sobering thought for the future as I prepare for
the argument of new cases, which seem to me, as always, to raise
momentous issues that will live forever in the law. But it is in an-
other sense elevating that, even given the small relative number, so
many of the 1928 decisions remain central to the law today, which
perhaps best illustrates the nature of the common law process-con-
stantly to test and retest the rules and principles established by
judges of another day, and to retain and build upon what remains
sound.
Mrs. Palsgraf, as every student of the law knows, was waiting for
the Rockaway Beach train when a Long Island Railroad employee
dislodged a wrapped package of fireworks carried by another pas-
senger. The impact of the package falling to the ground caused an
explosion that toppled scales at the other end of the platform, injur-
ing her. Four judges voted to dismiss her case against the railroad.
Three of the seven thought she should have won. Ample authority
was collected by both sides; the opinions made a plausible, reasoned
argument for both conclusions. Yet in thousands of guises, that
bare majority decision-which of course became the law of the
state-has lived through the decades as a root principle of the law of
negligence. To this day we cite Palsgraf. The facts are modern-
should a landlord be liable when a 16-year-old is forced into his un-
locked building and attacked;24 should the state be liable to a mur-
21 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
22 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
23 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, reargument denied, 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928).
24 Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 505 N.E.2d 922, 513
N.Y.S.2d 356 (1987).
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dered student's family when a prison physician, completing a
college medical form for an inmate about to be released to attend
the college, fails to disclose the inmate's extensive psychiatric his-
tory;25 should the Transit Authority be liable when a young student
waiting for a subway train is beaten to death, while a toll collector
stands in the booth?26 What standard of care is owed to baseball
spectators, 27 to baseball players, 28 to jockeys,29 to trespassers,30 to
fetuses?31 Should damages be allowed for purely psychic injury,
and if so how far should responsibility for such injury be ex-
tended?3 2 The times are different, the facts are different, the an-
swers vary. But always the court's function is the same, that of
weighing and balancing the relation of the parties, the nature of the
risk and the public interest, and then setting the outer limits of one
person's duty of care to another, unquestionably an important ele-
ment in our social order today.
By the same token, only four judges of the Court of Appeals
several decades ago joined in another famous opinion, MacPherson v.
Buick,33 upholding the liability of an automobile manufacturer for a
defective wheel on a car purchased by the injured plaintiff. The dis-
senting opinion-again replete with creditable authorities-rejected
the imposition of liability on the automobile manufacturer because
it was the wheel that was defective, the wheel was made by someone
else, and the plaintiff was not the customer of the wheel manufac-
turer. There was no "privity of contract" between the injured plain-
tiff and the automobile manufacturer, and the dissent concluded
that under existing law there could be no liability. But the court's
25 Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 518 N.Y.S.2d
608 (1987).
26 Crosland v. New York City Transit Auth., 68 N.Y.2d 165, 498 N.E.2d 143, 506
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1986).
27 Davidoff v. Metro. Baseball Club, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 996, 463 N.E.2d 1219, 475
N.Y. 367 (1984); Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 424 N.E.2d 531,
441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981).
28 Maddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270, 487 N.E.2d 553, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726
(1985).
29 Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1986).
30 Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
31 See, e.g., Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (1985); Martinez v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697,
512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987). See also Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102
N.E.2d 691 (1951) (recognizing the right of an infant to recover against a doctor for
injuries in utero). The Court wrote: "We act in the finest common-law tradition when
we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice." Id. at 355, 102
N.E.2d at 694.
32 Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
33 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judges Hiscock, Chase, and Cuddeback
joined in the opinion of Judge Cardozo; Judge Hogan concurred in result only; Chief
Judge Bartlett dissented; and Judge Pound did not participate in the case at all.
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majority chose a different route. Although the dissent saw the auto-
mobile as an innocuous object moving at the speed of eight miles an
hour, the majority saw that same object as a potentially dangerous
instrument that could travel 50 miles an hour and had space for pas-
sengers. The majority therefore chose an entirely separate line of
authority that bypassed the notion of privity and instead treated the
automobile as a dangerous instrument for which the manufacturer
should be held liable, likening an automobile with a bad wheel to a
deadly poison falsely labeled. 34 And from that choice, an entire
body of product liability law has emerged and flowered.
MacPherson too has lived countless additional lives as appellate
courts throughout the country, responding to changing social needs
and social conditions, have inch by inch, case by case, moved the law
beyond privity of contract and beyond liability to the ultimate pur-
chaser, beyond the manufacturer, 35 beyond actual negligence,36 and
some courts, even beyond strict liability to enterprise or "market
share" liability,37 openly using policy-based justifications such as the
superior ability of manufacturers and sellers both to recognize and
cure defects, and to minimize and spread the risk among all con-
sumers. In our sophisticated, materialistic society, can anyone today
doubt the profound influence ofjudge-made product liability law on
our social development?
In Moch v. Rensselaer,38 a waterworks company furnishing the
water for city fire hydrants was sued by a warehouse owner when his
property burned to the ground because there was no water in the
hydrants to put out the fire. This time, however, the court denied
recovery because there was no "privity of contract" between the
warehouse owner and the waterworks company. The only contract
was with the city. The court perceived that to allow recovery, to
34 For an analysis of MacPherson, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 430-37.
"[P]rinciple, in terms of 'the needs of life,' must be recurred to constantly, so as to
correct and to readjust precedent-that is vital. But so far as it suggests that principles
themselves do not change, the suggestion is legal convention and not legal fact. Princi-
ples are born in travail, and some of them die, and sometimes, like the one here, they
take new shape in mid-career." Id. 436-37.
35 The cases, of course, are legion in this burgeoning area of law. For an interest-
ing development at ten-year intervals, see Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d
102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
36 See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1976); Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
37 See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581,
689 P.2d 368 (1984).
38 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
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enlarge the company's duty beyond its contract, would have been to
extend potential liability indefinitely. Today that same principle
also lives in many forms, most recently as the basis for decisions
favoring Consolidated Edison in suits for personal injuries suffered
by New York City residents during the last blackout. It was the
court's perception in 1985, just like Moch in 1928, that it would im-
pose a crushing burden on the utility if every person in the City of
New York who suffered injury during the blackout were allowed to
recover against Consolidated Edison. As a matter of public policy
the complaints were dismissed.3 9 That same concept of "privity of
contract" as limiting the ambit of tort responsibility was again criti-
cal in the famous case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,40 defining an ac-
countant's liability in negligence. More than 50 years later in Credit
Alliance,41 the Court of Appeals chose to adhere to the "wisdom and
policy" 42 of Ultramares; state supreme courts elsewhere, for policy
reasons, have chosen otherwise.
I believe I could multiply these examples in every area of the
law-substantive and procedural. 43 There is no question that appel-
late courts and appellate judges throughout the nation traditionally
and necessarily do shape the law and sometimes even make the law,
and that this is not a subject for sheepishness or apology.44 Judges
39 Strauss v. Belle Realty, 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985).
The judge-made law of municipal immunity comes quickly to mind as another Moch de-
rivative. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987).
40 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
41 Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536,483 N.E.2d 110,
493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
42 Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
43 Indeed, there are so many examples that I find it hard to stop reciting them. See,
e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) abrogating the
judge-made charitable immunity doctrine, in which the court wrote:
To the suggestion that stare decisis compels us to perpetuate it until the
legislature acts, a ready answer is at hand. It was intended, not to effect a
'petrifying rigidity,' but to assure the justice that flows from certainty and
stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers not justice but unfair-
ness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to survive,
and no principle constrains us to follow it.
Id at 667, 143 N.E.2d at 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11. See also Buckley v. City of New York, 56
N.Y.2d 300, 305, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 1090, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (1982) (abolishing the
fellow servant rule in New York) and McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 20 N.Y.2d
921, 233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967), aff'g 26 A.D.2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1966) (adopting the fireman's rule).
44 While Judges Cardozo and Holmes more than a half-century ago described judi-
cial lawmaking as interstitial and molecular-even that recognition of a limited poli-
cymaking role was at the time regarded as radical-I think it has long been true that the
traditional judicial activity is broader:
It is now a commonplace that courts, not only of common-law jurisdic-
tions but also those which have codified statutory law as their base, par-
ticipate in the lawmaking process. The commonplace, for which the
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exercising their policy-making function are not exhibiting a lack of
judicial restraint, and it strikes me as a false issue to equate the two.
Moreover, this accepted judicial function so permeates our social
order that, even if in principle subject to legislative correction, as a
practical matter its effects cannot readily be undone by legislative
action.
The concern-and I believe a valid one-is that there must be
limits. Judicial policy-making cannot be a freewheeling exercise. If
appellate adjudication is not a cold, scientific process of affixing
precedents to facts found below, neither is it a free-form exercise in
imposing a judge's personal beliefs about what would be a nice re-
sult in a particular case. Our government is after all a government
of law, and our court is a court of law. Though it must move, the
law also must have stability, certainty, and predictability so that peo-
ple will know how to conduct themselves in order to come within
the law, and will know what rights they may reasonably expect will
be protected or enforced. An appellate court decision resolves a
dispute between litigants, but it also establishes the rule for the fu-
ture. Stability is essential for fairness and evenhandedness: if cer-
tain conduct produces a result in one case, then blind justice should
produce the same result for other people in other cases like it.
Courts simply cannot decide one way one day and another way the
next. 4
5
Holmeses and the Cardozos had to blaze a trail in the judicial realm, as-
sumes the rightness of courts in making interstitial law, filling gaps in the
statutory and decisional rules, and at a snail-like pace giving some for-
ward movement to the developing law.... The simplest observation of
the vast, direct and profound overriding of old rules and principles and
the substitution of new ones in both the state and federal courts estab-
lishes the contrary, namely, that the courts do not confine their lawmak-
ing activity to the interstitial.
Breitel, supra note 9, at 765.
It is evident that the massive changes in the field of public law are greater
because of the need to interpret broadly-worded constitutional provi-
sions and the difficulty of constitutional amendment. But the capacity,
and the habit perhaps, of significant law creation under the pressure of
constitutional interpretation has extended to private law, and here with-
out the public and political controversy engendered by issues involved in
public law.
Id. at 766. In his article, former ChiefJudge Breitel offers an excellent analysis of the
reasons for and the limitations ofjudicial lawmaking.
45 [S]tare decisis does not spring full-grown from a 'precedent' but from
precedents which reflect principle and doctrine rationally evolved. Of
course, it would be foolhardy not to recognize that there is potential for
jurisprudential scandal in a court which decides one way one day and
another way the next; but it is just as scandalous to treat every errant
footprint barely hardened overnight as an inescapable mold for future
travel.
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425
(1976). See also Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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The point, however, is that they do not. There must be limits,
and there are limits. There is first and foremost respect for the sep-
arate functions of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment. I have found no better lesson in the significance of the
distribution of powers than the profound and enduring Cardozo
Lecture delivered by former Chief Judge Breitel, which concludes
with the observation that "self-restraint by the courts in lawmaking
must be their greatest contribution to the democratic society." 46
Statutes are limits; the court's focus is to implement the will of the
legislature, not its own will. Cases are limits; courts do not render
advisory opinions, they resolve live disputes on the facts before
them. Then too, appellate decisions are not written on blank sheets
of paper. They are the product of a system that values stability and
faithful adherence to precedent. They are the product of a process
of extracting the principles of the past and assiduously following
their path through history and logic. They are the product of con-
sensus among independent judges who are restrained additionally
by the traditions of the institution, not the least of which is the tradi-
tion of making public a reasoned explanation for the results they
reach.
My concluding thought from all of this is that the danger is not
that judges will bring the full measure of their experience, their
moral core, their every human capacity to bear in the difficult pro-
cess of resolving the cases before them. It seems to me that a far
greater danger exists if they do not.
46 Breitel, supra note 9, at 777.
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